HACKED ARCHIVE

Hacked Event Broadcast

Verified blockchain security incidents with original evidence and historical event dates.

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Hacked target: TAC2026-08-22

Description of the event: Layer 1 blockchain TAC was exploited when an attacker used a vulnerability in the shared Cosmos EVM precompile layer to drain approximately 2.985 billion TAC tokens (valued at around $7.5 million) from a single account. The project confirmed it was a drain (not a mint), total supply unchanged, only $TAC affected, and the flaw is not in TAC-specific code. The chain was halted at block 24,671,475; the team is coordinating with SEAL 911 and exchanges to track funds and plans to release a post-mortem and relaunch plan.

Amount of loss: $ 7,500,000Attack method: Contract Vulnerability

Hacked target: KiiChain2026-08-22

Description of the event: An attacker exploited vulnerabilities in the shared Cosmos EVM module (an arithmetic underflow in the staking precompile’s balance write-back after delegation, combined with vesting account handling and other undisclosed bugs). By creating a vesting account and deploying a contract to it, the attacker repeated the technique 18 times, draining approximately 148.3 million KII from various wallets. KiiChain halted the network at block 9355723 to stop further theft.

Amount of loss: $ 9,700,000Attack method: Smart Contract Vulnerability

Hacked target: The Sandbox2026-08-21

Description of the event: The Sandbox’s SAND cross-chain bridge (LayerZero OFT on Base and BNB Chain) was exploited. The attacker used a configuration function to gain sole verifier rights, minting large amounts of unbacked SAND and draining approximately 14.74 million real SAND (~$675,000) from the Ethereum vault. The project quickly halted affected bridging; Ethereum and Polygon assets remained unaffected.

Amount of loss: $ 675,000Attack method: Smart Contract Vulnerability

Hacked target: MANTRA Chain2026-08-20

Description of the event: An attacker exploited an unsigned integer underflow vulnerability in the upstream Cosmos EVM module to unauthorizedly transfer approximately 720.9 million MANTRA from two MANTRA-managed addresses (the burn address and a dormant genesis-era multisig). The chain was halted to contain the threat and later resumed after a v8.4.0 patch. No validator keys, admin privileges, or user funds were compromised.

Amount of loss: $ 3,600,000Attack method: Smart Contract Vulnerability

Hacked target: Allbridge2026-08-19

Description of the event: On August 19, 2026, the cross-chain bridge Allbridge was attacked. The attacker had prepared on July 26 by calling Circle’s MessageTransmitterV2.sendMessage on Polygon to forge a CCTP-style message claiming a 1M USDC transfer (with no actual burn) and obtained a valid attestation. On Aug 19, after a real CCTP deposit brought the Base Router balance to ~191k USDC, the attacker used the forged message via receiveCctpMessage (which lacked proper verification and credited it as a real deposit), flash-loaned ~809k USDC from Aave to match the claimed amount, and withdrew ~999k USDC, netting ~$189,800.

Amount of loss: $ 190,000Attack method: Bridge Logic Flaw

Hacked target: BounceBit2026-08-19

Description of the event: An attacker exploited a protocol-level authorization flaw in the Evmos stack, transferring approximately 286.5 million BB from nine mainnet accounts across 14 transactions without the owners’ authorization. No private keys were compromised, no signatures forged, and no wallets breached. BounceBit permanently sunset the L1 chain and reissued BB as a BEP-20 token on BNB Chain based on a pre-attack snapshot.

Amount of loss: $ 3,000,000Attack method: Smart Contract Vulnerability

Hacked target: Maya Protocol2026-08-18

Description of the event: Maya Protocol (MAYAChain) suffered a security vulnerability attack. The attacker exploited 6 chained edge-case bugs in Trade Account, outbound handling, and pool math, inflating accounting via false subsidy (e.g., ARB.LINK pool), then added/removed liquidity to extract ~48.87M CACAO and convert to ~20.83 BTC plus other assets, causing ~$1.7 million loss. The team paused global operations to fix the issues and seeks fund recovery.

Amount of loss: $ 1,700,000Attack method: Smart Contract Vulnerability

Hacked target: FoxMarket2026-08-15

Description of the event: FoxMarket (a DeFi project on BSC) had its FoxLpBondsPool.stake() function calculate and fix _stakeAmount from a manipulable Pancake AMM spot quote before a large USDT→Fox swap. The attacker used flash loans to skew pair reserves, then addLiquidity used a mismatched ratio; Treasury.lpBonds() trusted the stale value, minted excess Fox tokens, and sent inviter rewards to an attacker-controlled address, which were sold in the same transaction.

Amount of loss: $ 118,700Attack method: Flash Loan Attack

Hacked target: Harmony Protocol2026-08-11

Description of the event: The Harmony Layer-1 blockchain was exploited, allowing an attacker to unauthorizedly mint approximately 4 billion ONE tokens (about 26% of the supply) via empty blocks and related flaws. Large amounts were quickly funneled to exchanges for sale, causing the token price to crash ~30-40%. The team confirmed the incident, paused the cross-chain bridge, released an emergency validator patch to stop further minting, coordinated with exchanges to freeze funds, and is evaluating a chain rollback.

Amount of loss: $ 3,200,000Attack method: Protocol Logic Vulnerability

Hacked target: USM2026-08-10

Description of the event: The USM protocol suffered an exploit due to a pricing logic flaw in the ethFromDefund() function within defund(). It uses the arithmetic mean of the current and estimated final FUM sell prices for a single redemption but lacks “split invariance.” Combined with the per-redemption state contraction (adjShrinkFactor) and integer rounding, an attacker used a flash loan to call fund() to manipulate internal pricing, then split the same FUM amount into 64 small defund() calls, extracting more ETH than a single large call and causing a loss of ~70.83 ETH.

Amount of loss: $ 136,000Attack method: Smart Contract Vulnerability

Hacked target: Coinsbuy2026-08-09

Description of the event: Wallets linked to Coinsbuy (a B2B crypto payment processor) were drained of more than $7.9 million across Ethereum and TRON around 13:00 UTC on August 9, 2026. The attacker laundered part of the funds into Monero (XMR) via exchanges, while ChangeNOW helped freeze a six-figure amount; Coinsbuy temporarily paused deposits and withdrawals, which have since resumed.

Amount of loss: $ 7,900,000Attack method: Unknown

Hacked target: Oraichain2026-08-09

Description of the event: Oraichain (AI Layer 1) suffered from a vulnerability in its EVM cross-chain transfer path, enabling unauthorized minting of ORAI tokens. The network has been halted since 04:00 UTC on August 9, 2026, with bridges, cross-chain routes, and public interfaces restricted. The exploit path has been identified and addressed; the team is working with partners and CEXs to limit fund movements and is preparing to burn the unauthorized minted balances and reconcile protocol states to restore the canonical ORAI supply.

Amount of loss: 0Attack method: Cross-Chain Bridge Exploit

Hacked target: Coreum Bridge2026-08-09

Description of the event: On August 9, 2026, the cross-chain bridge connecting the XRP Ledger and Coreum (now tx) was exploited. The attacker abused a flaw in the deposit-verification/relayer logic by creating fake deposits (self-transfers of the bridge’s own wrapped tokens with valid memos), tricking the relayers into authorizing real XRP withdrawals from the bridge’s reserve. Nearly 200,000 XRP (~$200,000) was drained in 94 multisig transactions over 97 minutes.

Amount of loss: $ 200,000Attack method: Bridge Logic Vulnerability

Hacked target: Atomic Green2026-08-08

Description of the event: Atomic Green (a non-custodial leveraged trading protocol on Arbitrum) was exploited due to a signature replay vulnerability. The same manager signature could be replayed across 21 different Uniswap V3 LP positions, combined with flashloan-based price manipulation, allowing the attacker to trigger unauthorized full LP burns and resulting in a loss of approximately 29,984.27 USDC.

Amount of loss: $ 29,984.27Attack method: Signature Replay Attack

Hacked target: RRWallet2026-08-06

Description of the event: Security firm Coinspect disclosed that RRWallet (RenrenBit’s wallet) generated vulnerable seed phrases due to a weak RNG in the CryptoJS library (Ill Bloom vulnerability, CVE-2026-71851), making private keys predictable and leading to theft. One user lost approximately $2 million.

Amount of loss: $ 2,000,000Attack method: Supply Chain Attack

Hacked target: Unistreets2026-08-06

Description of the event: Unistreets LaunchpadFactoryAuto contract on Ethereum was exploited via arbitrary calldata injection. The factory custodied all launched tokens’ Uniswap V4 LP NFTs; the attacker injected setApprovalForAll approval and burned multiple LP positions, draining liquidity for a loss of approximately $17,750.

Amount of loss: $ 17,750Attack method: Smart Contract Vulnerability

Hacked target: KITE Foundation2026-08-06

Description of the event: The KITE Foundation detected abnormal KITE token transfers on Ethereum mainnet, confirming that some wallet addresses had been compromised by hackers. The team urgently paused ERC-20 transfers and related cross-chain channels, with no asset losses to users or the project. A new contract was later deployed, airdropping new tokens 1:1 to legitimate addresses based on the snapshot at block 25,692,498, excluding attacker-controlled addresses.

Amount of loss: 0Attack method: Private Key Leakage

Hacked target: ZEUS2026-08-05

Description of the event: ZEUS (Bitcoin Lightning Network wallet and LSP provider) infrastructure suffered a cybersecurity incident/attack within the last few hours; the attack was mitigated. Services were temporarily taken offline for a full systems audit out of caution; no customer funds were lost or at risk, and closed LSP channels will be replaced upon restoration. The incident appears limited to ZEUS infrastructure, with no evidence of a Lightning node software vulnerability.

Amount of loss: 0Attack method: Infrastructure Compromise

Hacked target: RISEx2026-08-03

Description of the event: On August 3, 2026, an unauthorized withdrawal of 673,011.56 USDC occurred from the RWA strategy linked to RISEx’s XLP vault due to a misconfiguration present since its July 13 deployment. The team detected it within minutes, patched it by 08:09 UTC, and fully compensated XLP depositors using a portion of July fees; the platform and other components continued operating normally.

Amount of loss: $ 673,011.56Attack method: Smart Contract Vulnerability

Hacked target: LOOPSDAO2026-08-02

Description of the event: LOOPSDAO’s LpdFi protocol on BSC was exploited. The attacker used a flash loan to manipulate the spot price of the thin PancakeSwap LPD/USDC pair (no TWAP or deviation guard), opened a massively inflated interest-bearing position with minimal LPD, and claimed interest right across the daily settlement boundary. This triggered the protocol to burn its own Cake-LP and pay out the inflated amount, draining approximately $690,000.

Amount of loss: $ 690000Attack method: Price Manipulation