Description of the event: The MOKE token protocol on BNB Chain was exploited via a smart contract vulnerability. The attacker abused an unprotected public claim() function in MokeToken.releaseContract() (no eligibility check on the caller), repeatedly draining ~166 million MOKE from the protocol’s internal reserve pool, then used flash loans, Venus leverage, LP removal, and dividend distribution mechanisms to convert it into ~1,546 BNB, resulting in a loss of approximately $907,700.
Hacked Event Broadcast
Verified blockchain security incidents with original evidence and historical event dates.
Description of the event: Coldcard hardware wallets (by Coinkite) suffered from a firmware bug (since March 2021 on certain versions) that generated seeds with insufficient entropy (~40 bits on Mk3, ~72 bits on newer models vs. the intended 128 bits). Attackers offline brute-forced predictable private keys and drained numerous single-signature Bitcoin addresses across multiple waves without ever accessing the devices, with cumulative losses exceeding $100 million and the incident ongoing.
Description of the event: The DeFi protocol Set Protocol (involving Index Coop’s ExchangeIssuance contract) was exploited due to insufficient state locking in the smart contract. The attacker used a malicious manager pre-issue hook to artificially inflate asset valuations (e.g., positionMultiplier), causing the contract to transfer excess assets based on falsified data, resulting in a loss of approximately $9,600.
Description of the event: The decentralized asset management protocol Swan Treasury on BNB Chain was exploited due to the leakage of an off-chain signer's private key (the _signer key hardcoded in the ZhaiquanBuy contract). The attacker forged valid signatures and used PancakeSwap flash loans to purchase approximately 687,000 STY tokens at around a 100x discount (spending approximately 19,700 USDT). The attacker then forged the related claim()/transfer signatures and dumped the tokens into the STY/USDT pool, making a profit of approximately $625,000.
Description of the event: The Pro token contract of Crypto DAO was exploited due to missing access control, with the attacker calling publicly accessible vault functions. According to GoPlus Security’s analysis, the attacker’s actual profit was approximately $52,000, while the contract lost around 167,200 Pro tokens. The related addresses monitored by Blockaid collectively held approximately $8.2 million worth of USDT (not the actual stolen amount).
Description of the event: The LULA token on BSC was exploited when attackers abused the privileged recycle() function in its contract, combined with an approximately $237 million flash loan to manipulate PancakeSwap V2 liquidity pool reserves, resulting in a loss of about $578,100.
Description of the event: The owner privileges of a WEMIX$-related smart contract were compromised, allowing the attacker to illegally mint approximately 5.23 million WEMIX$ stablecoins (worth about $6.25 million), which were swapped into WEMIX and USDC.e before being bridged out. The team has suspended bridges and related services while working with exchanges, security firms, and law enforcement to track the funds.
Description of the event: Security firm Blockaid detected an ongoing exploit targeting Garden Finance’s HTLC contracts, draining about $450,000 in USDT across Ethereum, Base, Arbitrum, and BNB Chain. The project stated that an independent solver’s off-chain database was compromised and fraudulent records were inserted, causing improper fund releases; the protocol and smart contracts themselves were not compromised, and the app has been temporarily taken offline.
Description of the event: ChainConnect’s EVM integration was compromised through unauthorized access. Approximately $650,000 in tokens was drained from the bridge contracts across Ethereum, BNB Chain, Avalanche C-Chain and Polygon in 23 transactions; bridge operations were paused immediately.
Description of the event: The Bankrbot X account (despite on-device passkey) was compromised and posted fake airdrop links; concurrently, the project's Bankr wallet (without MFA) was drained of ~1.5 billion $BNKR tokens which were then dumped.
Description of the event: The Projekt (GREEN/GOLD) reward vault on Ethereum was exploited. The attacker flash-loaned ~14K WETH from Morpho, pushed it into multiple Uniswap V2 memecoin pairs and used skim() to create fake “purchase” records. Exploiting the permissionless trackPurchase function (which only reads token balance deltas to size rewards without verifying actual ETH spent), they inflated reward allocations and drained ~301.7 ETH (~$560K) from the vault’s reward pool via massWithdraw.
Description of the event: On July 24, 2026, Lien Finance (an Ethereum DeFi structured products protocol) was exploited. The attacker abused a validation flaw in the exchangeEquivalentBonds function of the BondMakerCollateralizedEth contract (missing multiset integrity checks), minting unbacked bond tokens and draining approximately $542K USDC via OTC pools.
Description of the event: Singapore-based stablecoin payments firm Triple-A suffered unauthorized access to its hot wallets across multiple chains, with attackers draining approximately $9.7M–$11.8M in company-owned digital assets that were swapped and bridged/consolidated to a single Ethereum address. Client funds remained unaffected in separate trust accounts; services were briefly paused for security checks and have been fully restored.
Description of the event: The Verus Ethereum Bridge was exploited again. The attacker abused the bridge’s import path to trigger unbacked payouts on the Ethereum side, draining approximately $7.54 million in assets (ETH, tBTC, USDC, etc.) from the bridge reserves. This is the second exploit of the same flaw from May. The project has not issued a detailed official statement yet.
Description of the event: Solido Cash (the largest DeFi protocol on Supra) was exploited due to an oracle misassignment on SOLID collateral (stale feed fallback to CASH oracle, severely overvaluing collateral). The attacker, in two waves (one atomic tx + one multi-wallet manual), deposited cheap collateral, minted excess CASH, and sold it on DEXs for SUPRA, netting ~293.7M SUPRA. No user funds were affected; losses primarily hit LPs (mostly the foundation) and protocol reserves. The protocol paused relevant functions and released a forensic report.
Description of the event: The AFX-operated cross-chain/USDC custody bridge on Arbitrum was exploited. The attacker used compromised validator hot keys to meet the quorum and drain approximately $24.15 million USDC. The funds were bridged to Ethereum and swapped for ETH. Arbitrum’s native bridge was unaffected, and AFX’s core trading infrastructure remained secure. The team suspended bridge operations and is investigating with security partners.
Description of the event: The 42DAO protocol was exploited. The attacker manipulated the Median Oracle with an abnormally low BTCB price, triggering forced liquidations of multiple BTCB vaults and profiting approximately $915,000. This caused its algorithmic stablecoin Balance Coin (BLC) to crash over 99% from near $1 to about $0.001.
Description of the event: FlashTrade (a Solana perps protocol) detected an unauthorized $98,000 withdrawal from its ephemeral instance. As a precaution, trading, deposits, and withdrawals were paused. Thanks to the newly rolled-out withdrawal batching and monitoring system, the incident was detected quickly and contained. The team will fully cover the amount, with all user funds safe.
Description of the event: Wanchain’s Cardano-to-BNB Chain cross-chain bridge was exploited. The attacker drained approximately 515 million NIGHT tokens from the Cardano-side lock address. The incident may involve signature validation or replay flaws. Wanchain suspended the bridge; Midnight’s core network was unaffected. Multiple exchanges froze related funds, and NIGHT price dropped sharply before partial recovery.
Description of the event: Cross-chain bridge protocol Allbridge Core was exploited on July 19-20, 2026. The attacker used a ~$1.12M USDC flash loan from Kamino to rapidly swap in the Solana USDC/USDT liquidity pools, manipulating ratios and draining approximately $1.65 million. The team paused the protocol, urged affected LPs to withdraw funds immediately, and asked arbitrage profiteers to return funds for LP compensation.