Greenfield Capital, an investor in Safe, has filed a supervisory complaint with Switzerland’s Federal Supervisory Authority for Foundations (ESA), requesting intervention in the Safe Ecosystem Foundation’s governance structure. In an open letter to the community, founding partner Jascha Samadi stated that months of direct engagement failed to resolve concerns regarding the foundation’s board composition and strategic direction. The firm argues that Safe will not reach its potential under current leadership, citing a lack of independent voices and alleged conflicts of interest involving board members Richard Meissner and George.
The dispute arises amid significant performance divergence between Safe and the broader decentralized finance market. While total DeFi value locked grew by 40% between January 2024 and August 2026, the total value held in Safe accounts declined from $66 billion to $30 billion, a drop exceeding 50%. Additionally, Safe’s share of USDC in circulation fell from 12.8% to 2.5%, despite stablecoin supply growing roughly 135% during the same period. Greenfield highlighted that second-quarter revenue stood at $1.98 million, annualizing to $8 million, which is far below the $20 million expectation for 2026. This contrasts with Safe’s earlier report of more than $10 million in annualized revenue at the end of 2025 and its long-term goal of reaching $100 million in annual recurring revenue by 2030.
The escalation of this dispute to a national regulatory body marks a critical shift in how institutional investors address perceived mismanagement within crypto foundations. By invoking the Swiss Federal Supervisory Authority for Foundations, Greenfield is leveraging specific jurisdictional mechanisms designed to oversee non-profit entities, signaling that traditional dialogue channels have been exhausted. This move underscores the tension between the operational autonomy of decentralized protocols and the fiduciary expectations of early-stage capital providers who rely on clear governance structures to protect their investments.
Market data cited in the complaint reveals a stark disconnect between Safe’s infrastructure utility and its financial capture. The decline in Safe’s share of USDC circulation, even as the overall stablecoin market expanded, suggests that competitors or alternative custody solutions are gaining traction faster than Safe can retain value. For the broader sector, this case highlights the risks associated with concentrated board control in self-custody infrastructure projects. If regulatory intervention forces board restructuring, it may set a precedent for how other crypto foundations manage conflicts of interest and maintain competitive relevance in a maturing market.
